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THE CLEAN WATER ACT: WHEN DUMPING DEAD FISH IS
NOT THE DISCHARGE OF A POLLUTANT-National Wildlife
Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
Abstract: The Clean Water Act defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.". This Note examines National
Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., in which the court held that an addition
occurs only when a pollutant is introduced into water from the outside world. The Note
argues that legislative history and the structure of the Clean Water Act demand an inter-
pretation of "addition" which includes causing a pollutant to appear in water.
The Ludington Pumped Storage Plant, on the eastern shore of Lake
Michigan, is one of the largest pumped storage facilities in the world.1
It generates electricity by pumping water from Lake Michigan into an
elevated reservoir during low electrical demand hours, then releasing
the water through turbines into the lake during peak demand hours.
The plant is also the largest single fish killer in the Great Lakes.' Fish
are killed during both pumping and power generation, either by water
pressure or by turbine blades.4 The result is the release of dead fish
and fish parts into Lake Michigan.5
In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.,6 the Sixth
Circuit held that the Ludington facility's release of dead fish and fish
parts did not violate the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act").7 The
CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into the waters of the
United States' without a permit from the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA").9 The Act defines "discharge" as "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."' In Con-
sumers Power, the EPA admitted that dead fish were pollutants, but
1. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 581 (6th Cir. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Brief in Support of National Wildlife Federation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
at 18, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987),
rey'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988) (No. G-851146-CA) [hereinafter NWF Summary Judgment
Brief].
4. 862 F.2d at 582.
5. Id. Some fish survive the power generating process. They too are released back into Lake
Michigan. Id.
6. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1980).
7. Id. at 581.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West
Supp. 1988). The statute was amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566, and the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7. The statute, as
amended, will be referred to as the Clean Water Act, CWA, or Act.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
9. Id. § 1342(a)(1).
10. Id. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).
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argued that a pollutant is added only when it is introduced into water
from the outside world."1 Deferring to the EPA's interpretation, the
Sixth Circuit held that because the fish never left the water, the plant
did not add a pollutant when it crushed the fish and released them into
Lake Michigan. 2
Prior to Consumers Power, the question of what constituted the
addition of a pollutant under the CWA arose in two contexts, the first
involving dams. In National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 3 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that dams did not add pollutants.' 4 The
Gorsuch court deferred to the EPA's determination that a dam adds a
pollutant only if it physically introduces a pollutant into water from
outside the water. 5 The second context involved dredging, when veg-
etation or sediments native to a water body were moved or redepos-
ited. In these cases, the courts held that "addition" could mean the
movement or redeposit of a pollutant, and did not require the intro-
duction of a pollutant from the outside world.' 6
This Note examines the conflicting interpretations of "addition"
under the CWA and urges that the EPA interpretation used in Con-
sumers Power is unsatisfactory. Part I discusses the legislative history
of the CWA and relevant judicial interpretations of "addition." Part
II argues that the Consumers Power court erred in holding that the
EPA's interpretation of "addition" was reasonable. Specifically, the
EPA definition of "addition" undermines the CWA's broad remedial
purpose and is inconsistent with legislative history. Part II also argues
that Congress should correct the narrow EPA interpretation by explic-
itly defining "addition" as "introducing a pollutant into water or caus-
ing a pollutant to appear in water."
11. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 27-32,
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1441)
[hereinafter EPA Amicus Brief]; see also Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 585. The phrase
"introduced into water from the outside world," as used by the EPA to define addition, means
introduced into water from outside the water. See, e.g., Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 588-90;
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Under the EPA
definition, a pollutant which appears in water temporarily diverted from the main water body
must still be introduced from outside the diverted water. See, e.g., Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at
589.
12. 862 F.2d at 585.
13. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 175, 183.
15. Id. at 175. See infra note 52 (listing other dam pollution cases).
16. See United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh,
715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act assumed its present form in 1972:17 The Act's
purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biolog-
ical integrity of the Nation's waters."18 The Act set goals of fishable
and swimmable waters by 198319 and the elimination of all discharges
by 1985.20 These ambitious statements are frequently used by courts
as important tools in interpreting the Act's specific provisions.21 The
Act attempts to achieve these goals by prohibiting "the discharge of
any pollutant by any person."22 The CWA holds anyone violating this
prohibition strictly liable.23
The only way to avoid the Act's discharge prohibition is to obtain a
permit authorizing the discharge. The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES"), administered by the EPA, is the
Act's primary permit program.24 The EPA uses NPDES permits to
set maximum allowable levels of effluents which may be discharged
from a particular source.25 The CWA authorizes citizen suits against
any person who violates the terms of an NPDES permit 26 or who dis-
charges pollutants without a permit.27
Despite the CWA's absolutist language, not all sources of pollution
require an NPDES permit. The Act divides sources of pollution into
17. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
682, 683 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
19. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
21. See, e.g., United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506 (1lth Cir. 1985)
(given the broad objectives of the CWA, "addition" may be understood to include "redeposit"),
vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987). But see, eg., National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (district court "paid too much attention to the
broad stated purposes of the Act').
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
23. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 46 (5th Cir. 1980)
(unintentional discharges violate the CWA); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
374 (10th Cir. 1979) (CWA was written without regard to intent, making the person responsible
for a discharge strictly liable).
The Act imposes civil penalties for any violation, regardless of the violator's'mens rea, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982), and criminal penalties for willful or negligent violations, id. § 1319(c).
24. Id. § 1342(a). An authorized state agency also may assume responsibility for the NPDES
program. Id. § 1342(b).
25. Id. §§ 1311-1312.
26. Id. § 1365(a)(l)(a).
27. Id. § 1365(f).
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two categories: point source and nonpoint source.28 The NPDES pro-
gram regulates discharges of pollutants from point sources.29  The
CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollu-
tant to navigable waters from any point source."3 Therefore, four
elements must be present before an NPDES permit is required: (1) a
pollutant31 must be (2) added32 (3) to navigable waters3 3 (4) from a
point source.34 Where these four elements are identified, the pollution
is called point source pollution and an NPDES permit is required.35
Nonpoint source pollution is defined by exclusion: where any one of
the four elements necessary for NPDES regulation is missing, the pol-
lution is deemed nonpoint source pollution.36 While the Act exalts the
28. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988).
29. Id.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1982).
31. The CWA defines "pollutant" as "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and
agricultural waste discharged into water." Id. § 1362(6). Compare id. § 1362(6) with id.
§ 1362(19) ("pollution" means "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical,
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of waters").
32. "Addition" is not defined in the Act.
33. The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
34. The CWA defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
... from which pollutants are or may be discharged .... Id. § 1362(14). While the definition of
"point source" seems to suggest the picture of a pipeful of industrial wastes, the courts have
interpreted the term liberally, finding, for example, that tractors and backhoes are "point
sources." See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir.
1983) (bulldozers and backhoes are point sources); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620
F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980) (mining scrap piles may be point sources even though material may
not be carried directly to waters from the piles).
35. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), where the court
used a five-part test, considering "from" "a point source" as two separate elements. Id. at 164-
165.
The term "point source" is used in two different ways in case law and literature which
sometimes results in confusion. "Point source" can mean the discrete conveyance by which
pollution is introduced into a water body. See supra note 34 (describing statutory definition of
point source). "Point source pollution" is the label used to describe pollution which is regulated
under the NPDES program. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 (describing EPA's view of the Act).
36. 693 F.2d at 166.
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control of nonpoint source pollution as a national policy,37 its regula-
tion is left to state and regional authorities.38 In practice, this usually
means no regulation.39
B. Judicial Interpretations of "'Addition"
An addition of a pollutant is one of the four elements necessary to
find a discharge requiring an NPDES permit.' "Addition" is not
defined in the Act, and courts have interpreted the term differently
depending on the setting. In dredging cases, courts have broadly
interpreted "addition," while in dam pollution cases, they have nar-
rowly interpreted the term. Had the Consumers Power court used the
reasoning of the dredging cases, the court would have concluded that
the Ludington facility does discharge pollutants in violation of the
CWA.
L Dredging Cases
Two federal circuits have held that moving or redepositing natural
sediment or materials in navigable waters constitutes the addition of a
37. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(7) (West Supp. 1988).
38. Id. § 1329.
The 1972 amendments established a procedure under which states or regional agencies were to
develop nonpoint source control programs, id. § 1288, but this program largely has been labeled
a failure. 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.21, at 319 (1986).
Rodgers contends that it is generally accepted that the 1972 nonpoint program failed because of
the EPA's poor administration and Congress' failure to fund the program. Id.
The Water Quality Act of 1987 once again requires states to develop and implement nonpoint
source control programs, and authorizes federal grants for up to 60% of implementation costs.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(h)(3) (West Supp. 1988). However, there is little to indicate that the 1987
nonpoint program's fate will be any different than its predecessor's. No funding was provided for
the new nonpoint grant program in either fiscal year 1988 or 1989. See Department of Housing
and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
404, 102 Stat. 1014 (1988); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202,
101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
39. EPA officials estimate that nonpoint sources contribute at least 50% of total pollution
levels. C. COPELAND, WATER QUALITY: ADDRESSING THE NONPOINT POLLUTION PROBLEM 2
(Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 83241, 1986). Efforts to control nonpoint
source pollution fail for several reasons, including lack of political power, technological
infeasibility, and cost F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 362-64 (1984).
40. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (describing the four elements of a
discharge).
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pollutant. 41  In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh,42 the
Fifth Circuit held that cutting vegetation in a wetlands area and bury-
ing it there was the "redeposit" of a pollutant, a meaning reasonably
within the definition of "addition." 43 The Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. MC. C. of Florida, Inc.,4 came to a similar conclusion. The
M. C.C court held that the defendant's tug boats discharged pollutants
when their propellers cut into the bottom of a waterway, uprooting sea
grass and depositing sediment on adjacent sea grass beds.45 The court,
citing the broad objectives of the Clean Water Act and the Avoyelles
decision, declared that "addition" could reasonably be understood to
mean redeposit.4
6
The broad interpretation of "addition" adopted in Avoyelles and
M. C. C. is not limited to dredging cases. In Association of Pacific Fish-
eries v. Environmental Protection Agency, 47 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
an EPA regulation requiring NPDES permits for the discharge of fish
parts into waters from which the fish were originally taken. 48 In con-
trast to the broad interpretation of "addition" used in Avoyelles,
MC. C., and Association of Pacific Fisheries, however, the circuit
courts consistently have endorsed a narrow definition of "addition" in
cases involving dams.
41. These cases were decided under the "dredge-and-fill" provisions of Section 404 of the Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). As a concession to the Army Corps of Engineers' traditional role in the
dredging and maintenance of navigable channels and ports, Section 404 establishes a separate
permit system for the discharge of dredged or fill material. Zener, supra note 17, at 741. The
EPA Administrator, however, retains authority to restrict the use of a disposal site. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c) (1982). A "discharge" is defined as an "addition" under either the NPDES or Corps
permit programs. See id. § 1362(12).
42. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 923.
44. 772 F.2d 1501 (1lth Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
45. Id. at 1503.
46. Id. at 1506.
47. 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. Id. at 820. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 55,770-55,771 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 408 (1988)) (lack
of significant water quality degradation from discharges of fish parts would not justify exemption
from NPDES,program).
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2. Dam Cases
Dams pollute.49 Oxygen depletion, drastic temperature changes,
and nitrogen supersaturation°---all problems created by dams-have
been responsible for tremendous fish kills in many rivers." Regardless
of dams' harmful effects, federal circuit courts consistently have held
that dam-induced water quality problems are exempt from NPDES
permit requirements. 2 The definitive case holding that dams are not
point sources of pollution is National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. 3
In Gorsuch, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
EPA must regulate all dams under the NPDES program. 4 The dis-
trict court held that the EPA had violated the CWA by refusing to
regulate dams as point sources of pollution.5" The District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed, upholding the EPA's interpretation of "discharge
of a pollutant."56 The appellate court held that the district court
should have deferred to the EPA because the agency's interpretation
of the Act was sufficiently reasonable. 7 The court also noted that the
49. The Water Quality Act of 1987 directed the EPA Administrator to conduct a study of
water quality problems associated with the impoundment of water by dams. Pub. L. No. 100-4,
§ 524, 101 Stat. 75 (1987). The study documents substantial water quality problems associated
with dams: low dissolved oxygen, increased dissolved iron and manganese concentrations,
hydrogen sulfide production, nitrous gas production, and changed water temperature. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DAM WATER QUALITY
STUDY iii (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter DAM WATER QUALITY STUDY].
50. Fish stocks are adversely affected by all three conditions. See National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 161-164 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Attey & Liebert, Clean Water, Dirty
Dams: Oxygen Depletion and the Clean Water Act, I 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 705 (1984) (describing
the process of oxygen depletion in reservoirs); Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of
the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal
Columbia River Power System, I1 ENVTL. L. 211, 219 n. 32 (1981) (describing the process of
nitrogen supersaturation as the cause of gas bubble disease in fish).
51. See, eg., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1302 (D.D.C.
1982), rev'd, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
52. See United States ex reL Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd.,
717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. Department of the Army,
672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982). Some district courts have held that dams can be point sources of
pollution, thus subject to NPDES regulation. See Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291; South Carolina
Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978).
53. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). While the dams' pipes and spillways could be discrete
conveyances, and thus point sources, id. at 165 n.22, they did not discharge pollutants, and
therefore were not "point sources of pollution." Id. at 183.
54. 530 F. Supp. 1299-1302.
55. Id.
56. 693 F.2d at 174-75.
57. Id. at 171.
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CWA's legislative history did not mandate that dams be treated as
point sources of pollution.58
In Gorsuch, the EPA argued that dam-induced water quality
changes were not discharges of a pollutant for two reasons. First, the
water quality changes were not pollutants. 9 Second, even if the water
quality changes were pollutants, dams did not add them to the
water. 60  The agency asserted that an addition occurs "only if the
point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from
the outside world.",6
1
Gorsuch has been roundly criticized, both for the level of deference
accorded the EPA and for the narrow definitions of "pollutant" and
"addition" which it legitimized.62 Critics have focused on the result of
Gorsuch-that dams are not regulated under the NPDES program.
They also have raised the question of how the EPA's interpretation of
the CWA might limit the reach of the NPDES program in the future.
The question was answered when the Consumers Power court extended
the application of EPA's definition of "addition" beyond the dams
considered in Gorsuch.
3. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.6 3 presented
the court with an opportunity to choose between the broad interpreta-
tion of "addition" developed in the dredging cases and the narrow
interpretation articulated in Gorsuch. The National Wildlife Federa-
tion argued that the Ludington Pumped Storage Plant, operated by
Consumers Power, was discharging a pollutant-dead fish and fish
58. Id. at 177. The court recognized Section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1982), which mentions
dams as possible nonpoint sources of pollution, as only mild support for the EPA position that
Congress did not intend dam-caused pollution to be regulated under the NPDES program. Id.;
see infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of Section 304).
59. 693 F.2d at 174. Finding the EPA determination reasonable, the court noted that low
dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation do not plainly fall within the statutory list of
pollutants in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Id. at 171. Instead, these dam-induced changes were "water
conditions, not substances added to water." Id. (emphasis in original); see supra note 31
(discussing the definition of "pollutant").
60. 693 F.2d at 174-75.
61. Id. at 175.
62. See Attey & Liebert, supra note 50; Note, Dam-induced Pollution Is Not Within the Ambit
of NPDES Permit Program, National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 511 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Dam-induced Pollution]; Note, National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch: EPA Not Required To Regulate Dam-Induced Pollution, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 175 (1983).
63. 657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
920
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parts.' 4 Consumers Power urged that there was no addition of a pol-
lutant because the fish were already in the water.65 The district court
found that the EPA had not determined whether the Ludington facil-
ity, or pumped storage facilities in general, required an NPDES per-
mit for power-generating water releases. 6 Adopting the Gorsuch
court's test for when an NPDES permit is required,67 the court held
that an addition occurred when the Ludington facility "created" a pol-
lutant in the process of discharging water into Lake Michigan. 8 The
district court ruled that the Ludington plant releases therefore
required an NPDES permit.69
The Sixth Circuit reversed.70 On appeal, the EPA argued that an
addition occurs only when a point source physically introduces a pol-
lutant from outside the water.7" The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's
definition of "addition" should be accepted unless unreasonable.72
Finding the EPA position reasonable, the appellate court concluded
that the Ludington plant did not add pollutants because the fish never
left the waters of the United States73 and the plant did not create the
64. Id. at 1007-08; see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (describing the facility and its
operation).
65. 657 F. Supp. at 1008.
66. Id. at 1004.
67. Id. at 1005. The Gorsuch court used a five-part test for when an NPDES permit was
required: "'(1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point
source' Id. (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(emphasis in original)).
68. Id. at 1008. The district court recognized that Ludington arguably did not add a
pollutant from the outside world. However, 'the court found the NWF interpretation of
"addition" more in accord with the CWA's broad remedial purpose than was Consumers Power's
position. It also concluded that the NWF's position was not in conflict with the EPA's
interpretation of the Act in Gorsuch. The court commented that in Gorsuch the alleged
pollutants were not added from the point source. Rather, the pollutants were added in the
reservoir and downstream from the dam. Id.
69. Id. at 1009. The district court considered its holding consistent with United States ex rel.
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984), in which the Sixth Circuit had held that a dam was not a point
source of pollution. 657 F. Supp. at 1009. In Tennessee Valley Auth., the Sixth Circuit, citing
Gorsuch, held that seepage from a dam sited in the Ocoee River was not a discharge in violation
of the CWA. 717 F.2d at 998-99. The Sixth Circuit did not, however, specifically recognize the
definition of "addition" used in Gorsuch which requires an introduction of a pollutant from
outside the water. Id. It instead characterized the EPA definition as requiring that the pollutant
be introduced from the point source. Id. at 998.
70. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 584; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (the EPA participated only on
appeal, and as an amicus curiae).
72. 862 F.2d at 584.
73. The court held that the waters, although removed from the lake, remained navigable
waters. Id. at 589.
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fish. 74 Thus, the release of dead fish did not require an NPDES per-
mit.75 Furthermore, the appellate court found that Congress clearly
had intended to exempt facilities like the Ludington plant from
NPDES regulation.76
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Sixth Circuit invoked impressive authority for its decision to
give the EPA broad deference in Consumers Power.7' The court cited
the Supreme Court decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council7 for the rule that when a statute is silent or ambigu-
ous on a specific question, a reviewing court must defer to any reason-
able construction of the statute by the administering agency. 79 The
Consumers Power court also discussed Gorsuch as specific authority for
deference in the CWA context. 8° As the dissent in Consumers Power
recognized, however, even under the limited review used in Consumers
Power, the EPA's interpretation should have been found
unreasonable.8
74. Id. at 586. In dicta, the appellate court also stated that fish were pollutants, whether dead
or alive, and that the facts of Consumers Power could not be distinguished from cases where a
point source merely passed on pollutants already in the water. Id. at 585 ("[i]f the district court
decision were upheld, [an NPDES] permit would be required even for a dam which released alive
all fish passing through it").
The Sixth Circuit decision in Consumers Power was not unanimous. Judge Jones concurred in
the majority's conclusion that the district court was required to defer to the EPA's stated policies
concerning water quality changes. He dissented, however, from the conclusion that the EPA's
policies or any of the cases cited by the majority exempted the Ludington plant from NPDES
regulation. Judge Jones asserted that the Ludington facility added, or created, a foreign
pollutant. The majority, the Judge argued, should therefore have affirmed the district court's
ruling. Id. at 590-91.
75. Id. at 581.
76. Id. at 586. The court cited Section 304 of the Act as authority for the exemption. Id.; see
infra notes 112-130 (discussing the meaning of Section 304).
77. 862 F.2d at 585.
78. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
79. 862 F.2d at 584 (discussing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 590-91 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Whether the Consumers Power court was correct in according the EPA broad deference in its
interpretation of "addition" is beyond the scope of this Note. Regardless of the seemingly clear
language of decisions like Chevron, courts continue to find exceptions to the rule of deference.
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 790 F.2d
289, 296-298 (3d Cir. 1986) (although an agency interpretation is usually accorded a high level
of deference, the EPA rule regarding removal credits was invalid because it was inconsistent with
other provisions of CWA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
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B. Reasonableness of the EPA Interpretation of "'Addition"
In Consumers Power, the district court and the EPA definitions of
"addition" represent two distinct theories of liability. The district
court held that addition of a pollutant could mean "creating" a pollu-
tant, and did not require the introduction of a pollutant from the
outside world.8 2 This is essentially a "but-for" definition of "addi-
tion": but for the Ludington facility, the pollutant would not have
appeared in the water. 3 In contrast, the EPA definition of "addition"
endorsed by the Sixth Circuit has been characterized as a "trespass"
theory because the CWA is violated only when a pollutant is physi-
cally introduced from outside the water."4
The Sixth Circuit in Consumers Power gave little attention to Con-
gress' intended meaning of the term "addition." Instead, the court
focused on whether Congress would have required an NPDES permit
for the Ludington plant. Section 1 below considers the relative merits
of the EPA definition of "addition" and the interpretation used by the
district court in Consumers Power. The EPA's definition is unreasona-
ble because it undermines the CWA's broad remedial purpose and is
inconsistent with specific provisions of the Act. Section 2 concludes
that the Consumers Power court erred in finding that Congress clearly
intended to exempt facilities like the Ludington plant from the
NPDES permit program. Section 3 concludes that the court also
erred by failing to distinguish between the Ludington facility and the
dams considered in Gorsuch.
82. 657 F. Supp. 989, 1008 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
83. It is true that the fish, if not harvested, would eventually die and decompose in the lake.
However, they would not die at one time in the same place, producing a concentration of
decomposing biological material. See NWF Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 3, at 25-26.
The EPA admits that the discharge of dead fish and their remains from dams causes water
quality problems. DAM WATER QUALITY STUDY, supra note 49, at 11-8. If dead fish and fish
remains are discharged in significant quantities, the dissolved oxygen demands of their
decomposition may depress available oxygen. Id.
84. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 38, § 4.10, at 157-62. Professor Rodgers, discussing Gorsuch,
writes:
The textual compulsion for the trespass theory is said to turn on the inescapable reality
that a "pollutant" is something that is "discharged," that a "point source" is something
from which a pollutant is "discharged," and that a "discharge of a pollutant" occurs only
when there is an "addition" of a pollutant to the water. While this "addition" language
underscores the dominant congressional image of a pipeful of "bads" running into the
stream, there is little to suggest a congressional indifference had the members been alerted to
sleight-of-hand technologies by which the "goods" (e.g., the dissolved oxygen, low turbidity,
and so on) could be withdrawn through subterranean pipes to the detriment of water
quality. Under this view the statutory condition that a pollutant be "added" to the stream is
met if the source is the cause of the appearance of the pollutant regardless of the mechanism.
Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted).
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1. "Addition" Should Include Causing a Pollutant to Appear
The EPA trespass interpretation of "addition" is unreasonable for
two reasons. First, the EPA definition undermines the CWA's broad
remedial purpose by ignoring environmental effects. The EPA inter-
pretation naively ignores an activity's effect on the environment, while
the but-for interpretation reflects a better understanding of delicately
balanced aquatic ecosystems. Second, the EPA definition of "addi-
tion" is unreasonable because it conflicts with the Act's definition of
"pollutant."
a. The EPA Definition of 'Addition" Undermines the Clean Water
Act's Remedial Purpose
In Consumers Power the Sixth Circuit admonished the district court
for giving too much weight to the CWA's broad remedial purpose.
The Act's remedial nature, however, is one of the primary bases on
which two other courts have rejected a trespass interpretation of
"addition." In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh86 and
United States v. MC. C. of Florida, Inc. 87 the pollutants that were dis-
charged in violation of the Act were natural sediment and vegetation
dredged and redeposited in the same water body.88 Both the Avoyelles
and M. C. C. courts used the CWA's broad remedial objectives to reject
any requirement that the pollutant originate from outside the water.89
Avoyelles involved the redeposit of vegetation and sediment in a wet-
lands area.9" The facts of Avoyelles may appear distinguishable from
the facts of Consumers Power, but the differences do not bear on the
analysis of the term "addition." First, although Avoyelles was a
dredge-and-fill case9 ' rather than an NPDES case,9" this distinction
did not play a role in the Avoyelles court's analysis of "addition."93
85. 862 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1988); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156, 179-81 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
86. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
87. 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
88. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the dredging cases).
89. Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923 (that an "addition" can mean "redeposit" is consistent with
both the purposes and legislative history of the Act); M. C.C., 772 F.2d at 1506 (given the broad
objectives of the CWA, "addition" can mean "redeposit").
90. 715 F.2d at 901.
91. Id. at 922.
92. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988).
93. See supra note 41 (discussing identical definitions of "discharge" under the § 402 and
§ 404 permit programs).
The Avoyelles court did, however, state that the case was distinguishable from Gorsuch because
the pollutant was dredged or fill material. 715 F.2d at 924 n.43. See infra notes 106-111 and
accompanying text (discussing the definition of "pollutant"). The court in Avoyelles also
924
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Second, the facts of Avoyelles leave open the question whether vegeta-
tion was actually removed from the water before its burial. If the veg-
etation was first removed, Consumers Power can be distinguished
because the Ludington plant never removed the fish from the water.9"
In light of the Act's avowed purpose to restore the integrity of the
nation's waters, however, such a distinction is absurd. A pollutant is
not less harmful because it is briefly removed from the water and then
redeposited.95 Despite the absurdity, in Consumers Power, the EPA
insisted that the Ludington plant could not have added a pollutant
unless it first removed the dead fish from the water before redepositing
them.96
United States v. M.C. C. of Florida, Inc. 97 stands for the proposition
that an addition does not require the removal and reintroduction of a
pollutant that originates in a water body.98 The pollutants, uprooted
seagrass and sediment, were never removed from the water, and would
not have appeared but for the defendant's tug boats.99 Thus, M. C.C
implicitly endorsed the but-for definition of "addition"-the same def-
inition used by the district court in Consumers Power when it held that
the Ludington facility had created a pollutant.
Avoyelles and M.C. C. recognize what the EPA trespass interpreta-
tion ignores: that inserting an "eggbeater" into an ecosystem can be as
harmful as the introduction of a substance from outside. The EPA
definition of "addition" ignores the effect of activities like the opera-
tion of the Ludington facility. There was no question that the Lud-
ington facility killed fish and that the decomposing remains would
pollute the lake. Similarly, in Gorsuch there was no question that
dams cause serious pollution problems in rivers. Despite the obvious
indicated that the case could be distinguished from Gorsuch because the agency's interpretation
that redepositing materials may be a discharge was not in conflict with the interpretation of the
district court. 715 F.2d at 924 n.43. Therefore, the court was not in the position of having to
defer to an agency interpretation. Id.
94. 862 F.2d at 585.
95. On appeal, the EPA in fact argued that if the fish were removed from the lake, then
reintroduced from a point source, a permit would be required. EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 11,
at 27. If anything, the requirement that a pollutant must be redeposited before the EPA will
recognize a CWA violation implies that the EPA is concerned with the polluter's purpose to use
the waters for waste disposal. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (discussing
CWA's strict liability character).
96. 862 F.2d at 585.
97. 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
98. Id. at 1506 (the redepositing of spoil dredged up by the tug's propellers onto the adjacent
sea grass beds was the addition of a pollutant).
99. Id.
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adverse effects dams or pumped storage plants can have on water qual-
ity, the EPA trespass interpretation allows these identifiable polluters
to avoid responsibility.
Although a showing of harmful effect is not necessary to prove a
discharge in violation of the CWA, harmful effect is relevant to
whether an interpretation of "addition" plainly frustrates the Act's
remedial purposes. The court in M. C.C. showed an acute sensitivity to
environmental effect by implying that the court was as concerned with
the damage caused by the uprooting of sea grass and sediment as with
its redeposit of the pollutant onto adjacent sea grass beds." Simi-
larly, the district court in Consumers Power demonstrated sensitivity
to the integrity of the Lake Michigan ecosystem.
In Consumers Power, the Sixth Circuit not only ignored the effect of
the Ludington plant's operation on the Lake Michigan ecosystem, but
it also misunderstood the district court's but-for rule. The appellate
court discounted the district court's position because "live fish would
be just as much a pollutant as a mixture of live and dead fish." ' The
appellate court reasoned that Consumers Power would, therefore,
need a permit for the release of living as well as dead fish.' °2 The
court's reasoning is incorrect. The Ludington facility does not cause
the appearance of living fish, but it does cause the appearance of dead
fish and fish parts. Therefore, Consumers Power would be held
responsible only for the discharge of dead fish.' 0 3
The Consumers Power court did not rule on the merits of the district
court's but-for interpretation of "addition." It simply held that the
EPA's trespass theory was a permissible interpretation."° The forego-
ing analysis, however, shows that the but-for interpretation is vastly
preferable in light of the CWA's broad remedial purpose."0 5
100. As support for a broad reading of "addition," the MC.C. court cited the following
House report language: "Any change induced by man which overtaxes the ability of nature to
restore conditions to 'natural' or 'original' is an unacceptable perturbation." Id. at 1506 (quoting
H. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 753, 763- 64 (1973)).
101. 862 F.2d at 585.
102. Id.
103. See Consumers Power, 657 F. Supp. 989, 1008 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580
(6th Cir. 1988); accord Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1377 (4th Cir. 1976)
(the EPA may not require an industrial discharger to remove pollutants which enter a plant
through its intake stream).
104. 862 F.2d at 585.
105. The Gorsuch court stated that the CWA's purpose section should not be given too much
weight because Congress could not seriously have expected to achieve such grandiose results as
complete restoration of the Nation's waters. 693 F.2d 156, 180-181 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The fact
that Congress recognized that it might not achieve its goal should not, however, diminish the
Vol. 64:913, 1989
"Discharge" Under the Clean Water Act
b. The EPA Definition of "Addition" is Inconsistent with the Clean
Water Act's Definition of "Pollutant"
Carried to its logical end, the EPA trespass interpretation of "addi-
tion" would effectively deregulate some pollutant discharges. The
CWA's definition of "pollutant" includes substances or conditions
which by definition may not originate outside a water body. 10 6 For
example, a requirement that all pollutants must come from outside the
water would effectively eviscerate the CWA's dredge-and-fill provision
because dredged material usually originates in the water in which it is
finally discharged. 107 Heat is also a pollutant under the Act; 10
applied energy causes the addition of a pollutant-heat-but no sub-
stance is necessarily introduced.10 9 The statute's definition of "pollu-
tant" does not treat heat or dredged spoil differently from any of the
other named pollutants.1 0 Congress' inclusion of dredged spoil and
heat in the CWA's list of regulated pollutants therefore suggests that
Congress did not intend that a pollutant must be introduced from
outside the water before it qualifies as a regulated discharge.'
importance of the goal as a guide to specific regulatory decisions. See Note, Dam-induced
Pollution, supra note 62, at 535.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
107. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 924 n.43 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Corps of Engineers defines "dredged material" as "material that is excavated or dredged
from waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1988). Although it is theoretically
possible for dredged material to originate outside a water body, in practice it is improbable.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). See 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 39, § 4.10, at 158-59 (the
inclusion of "heat" as a pollutant suggests that Congress did not intend that a pollutant must be
physically introduced from outside the water).
109. The EPA regulates steam electric power generating facilities which divert waters for
cooling purposes. See 40 C.F.R. § 423.10 (1988). In Consumers Power, the EPA argued that
steam electric plants added heat because the heat was produced outside the water then later
absorbed by the water. EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 31 n.24. It is difficult to believe that
Congress would exempt an electric facility from the Act's discharge prohibition if it were
somehow able to site its operations within the water, thus producing heat within the water body.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
111. Dredged spoil and heat might be considered special cases because other portions of the
Act deal separately with the two pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (dredge-and-fill permits); id.
§ 1326 (thermal discharges). However, the separate treatment is not explained solely by special
physical qualities of the pollutants. The dredge-and-fill provisions were necessary to retain the
Corps of Engineers traditional role with such activities. Zener, supra note 17, at 741. The
thermal discharges section was necessary to accommodate special needs of the power industry. 2
W. RODGERS, supra note 38, § 4.38, at 574; cf Zener, supra note 17, at 714 (heat is treated
differently, in part, because it readily dissipates). Despite the Act's separate provisions for heat
and dredged spoil, the definition of "discharge" is the same as for any other pollutant. See 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (general discharge prohibition); id. § 1326(a) (thermal discharges); id. § 1342(a)
(discharges under the NPDES program); id. § 1344(a) (discharges under the Corps of Engineers
program); id. § 1362(12) (the Act's only definition of "discharge").
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2. The Clean Water Act Does Not Clearly Exempt Facilities Like
the Ludington Plant from NPDES Regulation
The Consumers Power court found that Congress clearly intended to
exempt flow diversion facilities like the Ludington plant from NPDES
regulation."'2 The court reasoned that the EPA's definition of "addi-
tion" and the agency's decision not to regulate the Ludington plant
were reasonable.113 An examination of the CWA shows, however, that
Congress did not mandate that the EPA exempt dams or pumped stor-
age facilities from NPDES regulation. Instead, the structure of the
Act and legislative history suggest that Congress intended that sources
of pollution should be regulated under the NPDES program whenever
feasible.
The appellate court in Consumers Power inferred congressional
intent to exempt facilities like the Ludington plant from Section 304114
of the CWA." 5 Section 304 requires the EPA to issue information on
guidelines for identifying, and procedures for controlling, nonpoint
source pollution. 1 6 Section 304 mentions several types of nonpoint
source pollution, including pollution resulting from "changes in the
movement, flow or circulation of any navigable waters or ground
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees,
channels causeways, or flow diversion facilities." '117 From Section
304, the court concluded that any pollution which is incidental to the
manipulation of waters by a dam or diversion facility would be exempt
from NPDES regulation." 8
Section 304 does not, however, exempt the activities it mentions
from regulation as point sources of pollution under the NPDES pro-
gram. As even the Gorsuch court observed, Section 304 does not man-
date that all dam-induced water pollution be treated as nonpoint
source pollution." 9 Instead, the section simply recognizes that there
112. 862 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1988).
113. Id. at 586-88.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (1982).
115. 862 F.2d at 587-88.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1982).
117. Id. § 1314(f)(2)(F).
118. 862 F.2d at 586-88. The court found that its conclusion that Congress intended to
exempt dams from regulation was further supported by Congress' failure to specifically include
dams as point sources of pollution in the 1987 amendments. Id. at 588.
119. 693 F.2d 156, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers
Power, 657 F. Supp. 989, 1007 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
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may be some nonpoint source pollution associated with dams or diver-
sion facilities. 120 Congress' recognition that dams or diversion facili-
ties sometimes would be nonpoint sources does not preclude their
being treated as point sources of pollution at other times. This posi-
tion is supported by the holdings in United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc. 121 and Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., Inc. 122 Although
Section 304 mentions nonpoint source pollution from mining activi-
ties,' 23 the Earth Sciences and Abston Construction courts refused to
read Section 304 as exempting mining activities from the NPDES pro-
gram. 124 As the Earth Sciences court implicitly recognized, when
Congress wanted to exempt a pollution source from the NPDES pro-
gram, it has said so clearly. 125  Rather than straining to infer an
exemption from Section 304, the Earth Sciences court looked to the
structure of the Act and concluded that Congress intended the
NPDES program to be used whenever feasible. 12 6 Based on the rea-
soning of Earth Sciences, the Ludington plant should be regulated
under the NPDES program because control at the point source is
feasible.' 27
120. 693 F.2d at 177. The NWF admitted that even under its construction of "addition"
dams could cause nonpoint source pollution. Id. (downstream bank erosion, saltwater intrusion,
pollution to the reservoir).
121. 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979).
122. 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(B) (1982).
124. Abston Constr., 620 F.2d at 44 (mining activities may embrace nonpoint and point source
pollution); Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373 ("we hold the district court erred interpreting 33
U.S.C. § 1314(f) as enumerating nonpoint source exemptions from [CWA] enforcement
regulations"). Congress has since exempted stormwater runoff from mining activities. See infra
note 125.
125. See Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 372-73. The Act explicitly exempts from the "point
source" definition agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (West Supp. 1988). The Act also exempts stormwater runoff from oil,
gas, and mining operations from the NPDES permit requirements. Id. § 1342(1)(2); see also
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the
EPA may not categorically exempt any point source from the NPDES permit requirements).
126. 599 F.2d at 373 ("Congress would have regulated so-called nonpoint sources if a
workable method could have been derived"). Many commentators commend feasibility of
control as the best explanation for Congress' purpose in distinguishing between point and
nonpoint sources of pollution. See, eg., 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 38, § 4.10, at 150-52; Van
Putten & Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean WaterAct, 19 J. oF L. REFORM 863, 878 (1986).
But see, ag., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 176 (point-nonpoint division
cannot be explained solely by feasibility of control; Congress was also concerned with federalism
issues).
127. In 1987, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), which licenses hydro-
electric facilities, ordered Consumers Power to install a barrier net to prevent the entrainment
and extrainment of fish at the Ludington facility. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co.
862 F.2d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 1988). As of February 1989, the net had not been installed.
Telephone interview with Robert Fineman, attorney for Consumers Power Company, Honigman
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The EPA also argued that Section 304 excluded flow diversion facil-
ities from the NPDES program when the facility is operated without a
purpose to use the waters for waste disposal.' 28 Thus, the Ludington
facility's release of dead fish could be distinguished from a seafood
processor's discharge of fish parts because the latter uses the waters
with the purpose of disposing of waste. 29 This distinction, however, is
inimical to a strict liability statute like the CWA' 3 ° and again infers an
exemption from Section 304 where none was intended.
3. The Consumers Power Court Failed to Distinguish Between the
Dams in Gorsuch and the Ludington Facility
The Consumers Power court refused to recognize differences
between the Ludington facility and the dams already held exempt
from the NPDES program.13 ' The differences provide a principled
basis for limiting the EPA's trespass definition of "addition" to the
dam cases. In Gorsuch, the court recognized policy considerations
unique to dams sited in rivers.' 32 These considerations buttressed the
EPA's interpretation and application of the term "addition. 133 The
Consumers Power court failed to see, however, that these same policy
considerations do not apply to the Ludington facility.
The Gorsuch court was sympathetic to two policy arguments offered
in favor of excluding dams from the NPDES program. First, dams can
be a major component of state water resource management, providing
water storage, irrigation, and flood protection. 33 The CWA expresses
a policy of noninterference with states' authority to allocate waters
within their jurisdiction. 35  While this argument was persuasive in
Gorsuch, it is patently unpersuasive when applied to the Ludington
Miller Schwartz and Cohn, Detroit, Michigan (Feb. 14, 1989) (notes on file with Washington
Law Review). For the view that FERC is not equipped to ensure fishery protection, see Bodi &
Erdheim, Swimming Upstream: FERC's Failure to Protect Anadromous Fish, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 7
(1986).
128. EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 27-28 n.21.
129. Id.
130. Strict liability, by definition, means that purpose or intent are irrelevant to whether a
person has violated the Act. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the CWA's
strict liability character).
131. 862 F.2d at 589-90 (the Ludington facility is a dam because it impounds water). It was
the majority's refusal to recognize differences between the Ludington facility and the dams in
Gorsuch that the dissent found most troublesome. Id. at 591 ('because I disagree with the
majority's conclusion that the Ludington facility merely changes the movement, flow, or
circulation of navigable waters, I cannot accept the majority's reliance on Gorsuch").
132. 693 F.2d 156, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982).
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facility, which serves no storage, irrigation, or flood control purpose.
Second, the Gorsuch court found that the severity of dam-caused pol-
lution and the cost of its control was highly site-specific.' 36 The EPA
would therefore have difficulty creating national uniform standards.137
Again, this argument carries no weight when the issue is whether a
single pumped storage facility should be regulated.1 38  In Gorsuch,
these policy arguments supported a holding that the EPA's interpreta-
tion and application of "addition" was reasonable. The Sixth Circuit
failed to recognize that these policy arguments did not support a simi-
lar holding in Consumers Power.
C. Recommendation
Congress should correct the short-sighted EPA interpretation of
"addition." "Addition" could be defined as "introducing a pollutant
into water or causing a pollutant to appear in water." This definition
would embrace both stereotypical industrial polluters and less typical
polluters like the Ludington plant.
A legislative expansion of the term "addition" is supported by sev-
enteen years' experience with pollution control under the CWA.
Although Congress has tried to recognize the importance of control-
ling nonpoint source pollution, attempts to abate nonpoint source pol-
lution largely have failed.139 The failure to develop effective nonpoint
source pollution controls suggests that narrow interpretations of the
Act's terms should not be allowed to increase the nation's reliance on
nonpoint programs. By making it more difficult to prove a discharge
in violation of the CWA, Consumers Power increases reliance on
nonpoint source programs by shifting some polluters from the point
source to the nonpoint source category. In Consumers Power, the nar-
row definition meant that the National Wildlife Federation was unable
to prevent the Ludington facility from releasing dead fish into Lake
136. 693 F.2d at 182.
137. Id.
138. Even if the EPA were required to regulate all pumped storage facilities, there was no
evidence that the pollution from fish entrainment or that the cost of pollution reduction was
highly site specific. Instead, Consumers Power argued that the district court's holding would not
be limited to pumped storage facilities, but would require NPDES permits for hydro-electric
facilities sited in rivers which entrain and extrain fish. Reply Brief for Defendant/Appellant
Consumers Power Company at 10, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d
580 (6th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1441). However, it is possible that these dams would still be
exempted from the NPDES program based on the Act's policy of noninterference with states'
authority to allocate water resources. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' treatment of nonpoint
source pollution).
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Michigan."4 In the future, the EPA's narrow definition may prevent
citizens from enjoining activities which plainly degrade water quality
but introduce no foreign pollutant.
Unlike the EPA trespass interpretation, the but-for definition of
"addition" would bring the Ludington facility under NPDES regula-
tion. It might also require regulation of any hydro-electric dam which
killed fish in its power generating process.' 4' Where the dam-induced
water quality problems were of the type considered in Gorsuch, how-
ever, regulation would not be required because the water conditions
were not within the definition of "pollutant." Given continuing
problems with dam-induced water quality degradation, 142 Congress
would do well to consider expressly requiring NPDES regulation of all
dams and diversion facilities. However, if Congress does not want
dams or pumped storage facilities to be regulated under the NPDES
program, 4 3 Congress should expressly exempt them from NPDES
regulation. Express legislative action is preferable to agency exemp-
tion through tortured interpretations of the Clean Water Act and its
broad remedial purposes.'"
III. CONCLUSION
Consumers Power's immediate effect is that the Ludington plant will
continue to release thousands of pounds of dead fish into Lake Michi-
gan. A major purpose of the Clean Water Act is the preservation of
fishery resources. It is therefore ironic that the National Wildlife Fed-
eration was unable to prevent tremendous fish kills using the Clean
Water Act. The implications for the future are of greater concern. As
our understanding of aquatic ecosystems becomes more sophisticated,
we see the damage that can be caused by activities which previously
appeared harmless. A definition of "addition" which requires the
physical introduction of a pollutant into water from the outside world
reflects a naive understanding of environmental problems and unnec-
essarily limits the CWA as an effective weapon in the water pollution
battle.
140. See supra note 127 (discussing FERC's failure to enforce fish mortality mitigation plans
at the Ludington facility).
141. See supra note 138 (discussing policy arguments which might justify excluding from the
NPDES program hydro-electric dams sited in rivers which entrain and extrain fish).
142. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing dam-induced water quality
problems).
143. Congress did not take the opportunity to include dams within the ambit of NPDES
regulation when it adopted the Water Quality Amendments of 1987.
144. See Note, Dam-induced Pollution, supra note 62, at 536.
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The NPDES program is Congress' chosen method of dealing with
water pollution problems, and it can be used effectively and fairly as a
weapon against sources of pollution other than the stereotypical indus-
trial polluter. Congress should correct the EPA's short-sightedness by
explicitly defining the term "addition" as "introducing a pollutant into
water or causing a pollutant to appear in water." This definition
would help to give the NPDES program an appropriately broad scope.
Cheri Y Cornell
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